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The main determinants of banking crises in OECD countries 
 
Cristina Pereira Pedro1, 2, Joaquim J. S. Ramalho3, Jacinto Vidigal da Silva2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Banks’ stability can be affected by economic fluctuations, banks’ risk-taking behavior, connections 
among banks and countries’ financial system structure. At the same time, banking regulation and 
supervision were designed to protect banks from failure, but a large number of banking crises were 
not prevented recently. Using binary response models for panel data and focusing on OECD 
countries, this paper studies the main determinants of banking crises over a period of 21 years. Results 
suggest a bank’s high debt and a country’s low GDP growth rate as the major determinants of banking 
crises. There is also evidence of contagion across countries from the same geographical region and 
from G7 to other countries, and that bank-based financial systems are less prone to borderline banking 
crises. Regulatory and supervision practices are found not to have been relevant in bankruptcy 
prevention. 
Keywords: Banking crises, regulation, supervision, OECD countries, contagion effect. 
JEL classification: G01; G21; G28.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The central aim of this paper is to identify the main determinants leading countries to experience 
banking crises. In particular, because banks’ stability is expected to be influenced by their 
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, contagion effects, banking regulation and supervision and 
countries’ financial systems, this paper offers some insights into the impact of each of those five 
groups of characteristics on the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis. This study 
differs from previous research due to the comprehensive set of potential determinants of banking 
crises analyzed, the focus on OECD countries and the relatively long time period (1991-2011) 
considered, which covers 108 country-year banking crisis episodes. 
 
Many banking attributes and characteristics such as leverage, dimension and solvency tend to be 
emphasized in the literature as major determinants of banking crises (Benston et al., 2003; Cebenoyan 
and Strahan, 2004; Brewer et al., 2008; Inderst and Muller, 2008). Moreover, the influence of the 
economic context on the occurrence of banking crisis episodes has also been frequently analyzed; see 
inter alia Demirgürç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2000), Duttagupta and Cashin (2011) and Klomp 
(2010). These authors concluded that low real GDP growth rates, high real interest rates, sharp 
increases in credit expansion and banks’ exposure to the private sector increase the likelihood of 
banking crises. In this paper, these findings are revisited in order to answer the following general 
questions: (1) “Do the bank-specific characteristics in each country influence the probability of 
banking crises?”; and (2) “Do the country-specific macroeconomic conditions affect the probability 
of banking crises?”. 
 
Due to its relevance for banks’ activities, banking regulation and supervision may also be important 
determinants of the probability of a banking crisis. Some authors concluded that countries with fewer 
episodes of banking crises are those presenting lower regulation (Joyce, 2011). However, other 
authors, such as Barth et al. (2001), observed greater implementation of regulation requirements after 
a banking crisis. Typically, regulation focuses on capital requirements and assumes that (commercial) 
banks with lower required capital ratio are more prone to fail and that a well-capitalized bank will 
remain solvent even if it suffers a shock with many potential losses. However, some banking crises 
are characterized by other issues and may be originated by non-commercial banks. For example, the 
capital-based regulation following Basel II principles did not prevent the recent subprime crisis, 
which was characterized mainly by banks’ liquidity and leverage issues and emerged from the weak 
risk management policy of investment banks; see, e.g., Moosa (2010). In order to take into account 
other aspects besides capital-based requirements, in this paper two indices, a regulation index and a 
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supervision index, are used as a scheme to compile diverse information about these activities and 
answer the question: (3) “Can regulation and supervision prevent banking crises?”. 
 
The contagion effect considered in this paper refers to the transmission of systemic and non-systemic 
banking crises across countries where one or more bank failures in one country may lead to a banking 
crisis in another country. This effect is commonly observed in bordering countries, connected by their 
institutions’ businesses, but sometimes the initial shock is strong enough to reach institutions in 
distant countries, affecting a wide geographical area (Allen and Gale, 2007). In order to answer the 
question (4) “Can banking crises result from a contagion effect across countries?”, this article 
considers three distinct types of contagion effects, evaluating the likelihood of a banking crisis to 
spread to a given country when the initial shock takes place: in a country in the same geographical 
region; in a country in any other region; or in a G7 country. 
 
The final question that this paper tries to answer is the following: (5) “Do countries with bank-based 
financial systems have a lower probability of a banking crisis?”. Using Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s 
(2001) classification, this paper separates countries in market-based and bank-based countries and 
investigates which financial system is more prone to banking crises. According to those authors, in 
bank-based financial systems, banks play a crucial role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, 
controlling corporate managers’ decisions about investment and developing risk management 
vehicles. On the other hand, in market-based financial systems, corporate control, allocation of firms’ 
savings and risk management are shared by banks and securities markets. Hence, answering this 
research question will bring some insights about how those differences in countries’ organization and 
banks’ role can influence the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis. 
 
To investigate empirically the five questions formulated, a dataset composed of longitudinal data for 
OECD countries and the period 1991-2011 is analyzed. Because the variable of interest (occurrence 
of a banking crisis) is a binary outcome, several alternative binary panel data models are applied to 
study the determinants of a banking crisis. Similar models have been used inter alia by Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005), Davis and Karim (2008a), Boyd et. al. (2009), Moshirian and 
Wu (2009), Barrell et al.(2010), Joyce (2011), Klomp (2010) and Lainà et. al.(2015), in the context 
of banking crises, and Eichgreen et al.(1996) and Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) in the context of 
other types of financial crises. While most of those papers focused on the use of pooled models, in 
this paper the panel structure of the data is fully taken into account throughout the whole econometric 
analysis. 
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The paper is organized in six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 reviews the literature 
on banking crises and formulates the empirical hypotheses that this paper examines. Section 3 
presents the data and describes banking crises in OECD countries. Section 4 describes the 
econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, Section 6 provides some 
conclusions.  
 
2. The determinants of banking crises  
 
A bank’s stability depends on its ability to remain solvent and meet its obligations. However, banks, 
just like all market players, are exposed to the systemic risk that they cannot diversify and sometimes 
become insolvent, ask for governmental intervention or even collapse. When bankruptcy occurs, the 
banking system of the affected country experiences a banking crisis. Hence, through the years, several 
studies of banking crises have emerged in the financial and economic fields, but these events are 
recorded by regulators, central banks and academics from many different perspectives. This section 
briefly reviews some of the most relevant studies on this subject and describes the hypotheses tested 
in the empirical component of this paper. 
 
2.1. Previous research on banking crises 
 
The literature on banking crises is extensive and includes many studies developed using different 
methodologies and perspectives. Some studies focus on the influence of macroeconomic factors, 
business cycles and economic growth on banks’ failure (Miskhin, 1978; Calomiris and Mason, 1997; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Čihák and Schaeck, 2010). Others consider the role in 
banking crises of a variety of factors such as: depositors’ low expectations about banks’ financial 
health; bank-specific characteristics; regulatory and supervisory boards; and the socioeconomic 
context (Diamond and Dybvin, 1983; Gorton, 1988; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Hutchinson and McDill, 1999; and Hutchinson, 2002). At the empirical level, the focus has been on 
the general determinants of banking crises, but specific issues such as banking capital, regulation and 
contagion effects have also been largely analyzed in the literature. 
 
There is no common agreement on the extent of the influence of capital on the stability of banks. 
According to Diamond and Rajan (2000), more capital makes banks safer and improves their 
performance during periods of crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), because it ensures their 
profitability and the continuation of business even after a crisis. Moreover, Benston et al. (2003) point 
out that government concern for banks’ capital requirements works as a protection not just for banks 
5 
 
but for the government itself. On the other hand, Gropp and Heider (2010) conclude that regulation 
does not affect banks’ capital structure, because banks tend to present more capital than is required 
by supervisors, especially in countries such as the USA (Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and 
Jacques, 2001) and Switzerland (Rime, 2001).  
 
After a banking crisis, countries often adopt stricter regulatory and supervisory practices (Dincer and 
Neyapti, 2008), but over the years these levels do not change substantially, as observed by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2008). In particular, these authors found there have been no visible changes in 
regulation adopted by countries during the first decade of the 21th century. Moreover, they found that 
while some countries may have enforced required capital levels and increased the number of 
supervisory agencies, their banks’ stability and efficiency does not seem to have improved.  
 
Banking crises may also spread from the region in which they begin to neighboring regions and other 
economically linked countries due to cross-border banking linkages (Allen and Gale, 2007): 
countries’ borrowing and lending positions in other countries clearly promotes the spillover of crisis 
events through inter-connected countries (Tonzer, 2015). This contagion effect is also the result of 
asymmetric information (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000), because, without 
precise knowledge of the causes of the initial banking crisis, market players expect it to be repeated 
in other regions and their nervous behavior helps to propagate it. 
 
In this paper, most of the discussed features of banking crises are taken into account. In addition, 
because some countries, due to their particular characteristics, may be more prone to banking crises, 
a mechanism to act as a control for country-specific differences is also considered. One possibility 
would be to use the La Porta et al. (1998) classification of countries’ legal and cultural systems as 
based on common law (those presenting British influence) or civil or code law (those inspired in the 
continental European tradition, such as French, Scandinavian and German traditions). Instead, this 
paper uses Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s (2001) classification of countries according to their financial 
system. According to these authors, in countries classified as having bank-based financial systems, 
banks mobilize the necessary capital for firms pursuing the right projects and the activities of 
managers can be monitored by banks that are influential enough to enforce firms to disclose 
information and meet their obligations. Alternatively, countries are classified as having market-based 
financial systems when those activities are shared by banks and securities markets and information 
disclosure is permanent, investment diversification is frequent and standard risk management 
mechanisms are applied. 
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2.2. Empirical hypotheses 
 
The literature review undertaken in the previous section allows the identification of several factors as 
possible determinants of banking crises. In this section, a number of hypotheses on the impact of each 
factor on the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis are formulated. Five groups of 
hypotheses are considered, each group corresponding to one of the research questions defined in 
Section 1 and comprising several related hypotheses. For the factor mentioned in each hypothesis, a 
brief discussion on its expected effect (positive / negative) on the occurrence of a banking crisis is 
provided. 
 
Research Question 1: “Do the bank-specific characteristics in each country influence the probability 
of banking crises?” 
 
To answer this first research question, four hypotheses, each related to a different bank characteristic, 
are formulated. 
 
H1a: Bank size decreases the probability of banking crises  
 
Large banks can influence government and supervisory entities due to their importance in the 
financial system. For such institutions, political intervention is more likely and hence they present a 
lower chance of becoming distressed (Bongini et al., 2001). In addition, depositors and firms tend to 
place greater trust in large banks for deposits and investment financing. Large banks are also expected 
to present better internal organization and be more likely to recover from distress (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013). Therefore, in countries where banks are larger, the probability of experiencing a 
banking crisis is expected to be lower.  
 
H1b: Bank debt increases the probability of banking crises  
H1c: Customers’ deposits decrease the probability of banking crises 
 
Banks finance their activity with deposits, (non-deposit) debt and equity capital. Each source of funds 
implies different risk-taking levels and, as such, is expected to influence the probability of banking 
crises in distinct ways. Therefore, in this paper deposits and debt are treated separately, in contrast to 
other banking studies, where deposits are not distinguished from other forms of debt (e.g., Prescott, 
2001; Inderst and Muller, 2008). Because what matters is the relative importance of each financing 
source, no explicit hypothesis on the effect of equity capital needs to be formulated. 
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High debt means banks are more dependent on creditors and consequently less liquid, mainly if at the 
same time the amount of equity finance – referred to by Aiyar et al. (2015) as a buffer to bank loan 
loss prevention - is low. If a massive deposit withdrawal occurs, banks with a large proportion of debt 
will not have enough liquidity and may collapse. Thus, a positive relationship is expected between 
debt and the probability of banking crises: the greater the debt, the greater the probability of failure. 
 
Customers’ deposits are an alternative and complementary buffer to avert bankruptcy. They are a 
source of both capital and liquidity, protecting banks from default. Hence, the greater the amount of 
deposits, the larger the liquidity of banks and the lower the probability of a banking crisis. 
 
H1d: Bank solvency decreases the probability of banking crises  
 
More solvent banks are in better conditions to meet their medium and long-term liabilities. This 
capacity should be a fundamental characteristic of any bank, according to Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004). If banks respond to all creditors and remain solvent, the probability of failure through 
bankruptcy will be lower, implying a negative relationship between banks’ solvency and the 
probability of banking crises.  
 
Research Question 2: “Do country-specific macroeconomic conditions affect the probability of 
banking crises?” 
 
In this framework, three empirical hypotheses involving different macroeconomic aggregates will be 
investigated. 
 
H2a: The real gross domestic product growth rate is negatively related to the probability of banking 
crises 
 
The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is the main economic indicator. Its fall is a sign 
of recession and a collapse of the economy. Thus, a negative relationship is expected between high 
GDP and the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis (Bordo et al., 2001; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Joyce, 2011). 
 
H2b: Inflation is positively related to the probability of banking crises 
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When the inflation rate is higher, the demand for domestic products decreases in the international 
context (Hoggarth et al., 2005). The labor market is compromised and some jobs may be lost. 
Economic indicators slow down, failures will increase and favorable conditions for banking crises 
emerge. As observed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), banking crises tend to occur mostly 
when growth is low and inflation is high. They argue that high inflation is associated with high and 
volatile nominal interest rates that hinder the maturity transformation function performed by banks. 
Thus, a positive relationship is expected between inflation and the probability of a country 
experiencing a banking crisis. 
 
H2c: Domestic product per capita is negatively related to the probability of banking crises 
 
GDP per capita is a measure of a country’s average income and is commonly used as an indicator of 
its development. More developed countries are expected to have sounder institutions and more 
developed financial systems, being thus less prone to bank failures and banking crises; see inter alia 
Klomp (2010). Hence, in accordance with the observation of Boyd et al. (2009), a negative 
relationship is expected between GDP per capita and the probability of a country experiencing a 
banking crisis. 
 
Research Question 3: “Can regulation and supervision prevent banking crises?” 
 
This research question involves the following two hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Strong regulation reduces the probability of banking crises 
H3b: Strong supervision reduces the probability of banking crises 
 
These two hypotheses are described together because the same effect is expected from both regulation 
and supervision activities. Regulation and supervision were designed to promote bank stability, and 
are therefore expected to prevent the occurrence of banking crises. However, the empirical evidence 
provided so far is inconclusive. On the one hand, some of the recent literature on this topic concluded 
on no relationship between regulation/supervision and banks’ performance (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine, 2008) or found a lower probability of a banking crisis in countries with more open regulations 
(Glick et al., 2006; Dincer and Neyapti, 2008; Joyce, 2011). On the other hand, several studies dealing 
with specific regulation topics (e.g., deposit insurance, bank capital requirements, restrictions on 
banking activity) corroborate the hypotheses formulated in this paper. For example, Angkinand 
(2009) found that: output losses of crises are smaller in the presence of deposit insurance; the severity 
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of crises (especially for systemic ones) could be mitigated by higher bank capital requirements and 
fewer restrictions on bank activities; and requiring banks to hold sufficient capital could reduce their 
excessive risk-taking. 
 
Research Question 4: “Can banking crises result from a contagion effect across countries?” 
 
Contagion across countries can happen at many levels. In this paper, three levels of contagion are 
considered: contagion across countries from the same region; contagion between countries from 
different regions; and contagion induced by G7 countries. The empirical hypotheses to be tested may 
be expressed as follows: 
 
H4a: Banking crises are originated by contagion across countries from the same geographical region 
 
The most significant contagion is expected to occur inside the same region, because the nearest 
countries are culturally similar, have common businesses and straight negotiable relations. Thus, a 
crisis in one country may easily spread to a bordering one. 
 
H4b: Banking crises are originated by contagion across countries from any geographical region 
 
The globalization of financial services and the rise of large multinational financial groups led to the 
growth of business relations between remote countries, including some from different continents. 
Even when one of a series of geographically-distant banks collapses, the entire network of financial 
relations can follow suit and fail too. Consequently, the crisis can be extended worldwide irrespective 
of the distance from the country that suffered the initial shock (Allen and Gale, 2007). 
 
H4c: Banking crises are originated by contagion induced by G7 countries 
 
Financial dealings frequently occur with the most developed countries in the world. According to 
Chenguel (2014), all G7 countries (excluding Japan) were the major contagion sources of the 
subprime crisis, so contagion induced by G7 countries will also be tested in this paper. 
 
Research Question 5: “Do countries with bank-based financial systems have a lower probability of a 
banking crisis?” 
 
This last research question concerns the financial system of each country, involving two empirical 
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hypotheses. 
H5a: Bank-based financial systems are less prone to banking crises 
 
In bank-based financial systems, banks have a central role and benefit from greater government 
protection, being more powerful than in market-based financial systems. Bank-based countries 
usually present less competitive capital markets and investments are well controlled and collateralized 
in order to prevent default. Hence, the probability of a banking crisis is lower in countries with bank-
based financial systems (Čihák and Schaeck, 2010). 
 
H5b: The negative effect of debt on the likelihood of a banking crisis is higher for countries with 
market-based financial systems  
 
In bank-based financial systems, banks are included in a larger safety net than in market-based 
financial systems (a similar effect is obtained for countries with deposit insurance schemes, see Miao 
and Wang, 2015). Therefore, it is expected that in the former system there will be higher government 
guarantees and protection patterns that may allow banks to recover more easily from systemic shocks. 
Moreover, when confronted with the possibility of a financial collapse, the national government will 
tend to bail out banks in order to promote stability. This behavior implies that a large amount of debt 
is likely to be a more frequent determinant of banking crises in countries with market-based financial 
systems, where banks are less protected by government and other authorities. 
 
3. Data sources and model variables 
 
This section describes the sample and the variables used in this paper for investigating the 
determinants of banking crises. It also gives a brief characterization of past OECD banking crises. 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
The dataset used in this paper comes from several sources. Banking data were taken from Bureau 
Van Dijk’s Osiris database, which compiles financial information about financial and non-financial 
firms publicly listed worldwide. Banks with negative values of equity and observations from New 
Zealand, due to the low representation in the dataset (only one bank observed in a few years), were 
excluded. Overall, the sample includes 2.964 publicly listed banks from 33 OECD countries4 during 
                                                             
4 All OECD countries except New Zealand. 
11 
 
the period from 1991 to 2011. The number of banks per country is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 also reports the financial system orientation of the sample countries. Most countries have 
bank-based financial systems, but 74% of the observed banks are located in market-based economies 
due to the predominance of United States banks and the market-orientation of this country. Data on 
the financial system orientation of each country were taken from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), 
which, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, provides the most complete analysis of this issue in the 
financial literature. Given its structural characteristics, the financial system orientation of each 
country is assumed to be constant over the whole sample period. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) and 
Deltuvaité and Sinevičiené (2014) are examples of recent papers that considered a subset of OCDE 
countries and classified them also as reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of countries according to their financial system orientation.  
Source: Authors, based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
Bank-based Market-based 
Country 
N. of 
banks 
Country N. of banks 
Austria 18 Australia 27 
Belgium 16 Canada 26 
Czech Republic 4 Chile 16 
Estonia 3 Denmark 61 
Finland 10 Iceland 8 
France 119 Mexico 32 
Germany 68 Netherlands 16 
Greece 22 South Korea 70 
Hungary 4 Sweden 12 
Ireland 10 Switzerland 47 
Israel 14 Turkey 32 
Italy 75 United Kingdom 111 
Japan 262 United States 1 742 
Luxembourg 10   
Norway 40   
Poland 26   
Portugal 18   
Slovakia 12   
Slovenia 7   
Spain 26     
Total (n.) 764 Total (n.) 2 200 
Total (%) 25,78% Total (%) 74,22% 
 
 
Macroeconomic information was extracted from EIU country data, also distributed by Bureau Van 
Dijk. Due to missing data, the final panel is unbalanced, with a total of 647 country-year observations 
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and an average number of 19, 6 yearly observations per country. 
Data for regulation and supervision indices were drawn from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey (BRSS) carried out by the World Bank, which contains comparable world-wide data on how 
banks are regulated and supervised around the world. Four versions of BRSS have been released so 
far, namely in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012, which are available at the following link: 
http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0. For the countries analyzed in this paper, the data for each 
version was collected between 1997 and 1999 (2001 BRSS), in 2001 (2003 BRSS), between 2005 
and 2006 (2007 BRSS) and yearly in the period 2008-2010 (2012 BRSS). For reasons explained in 
section 3.3, the 2012 BRSS was not used in the construction of the regulation and supervision indices. 
 
Data on banking crises were taken from Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) database. As in their paper, 
banking crises are classified as systemic or borderline/non-systemic. A banking crisis is classified as 
systemic when two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the occurrence of significant bank runs, losses in the 
banking system and/or bank liquidation; and (2) significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system. It is considered as a borderline or non-systemic 
crisis when the two conditions above are not simultaneously met, but at least 3 out of 6 policy 
interventions from the following list are experienced: extensive liquidity support, substantial bank 
restructuring gross costs, significant bank nationalizations, significant guarantees put in place, 
significant asset purchases and deposit freezes and/or bank holidays. The sample used in this paper 
comprises 108 out of the 126 (country-year) banking crisis episodes registered in OECD countries 
from 1991 to 2011, including 76 out of 86 systemic crises.5Throughout most of the paper, systemic 
and non-systemic crises are not analyzed separately. 
 
Finally, to investigate the various dimensions of the contagion effect considered in this paper, the 
OECD countries were divided into the four geographical regions described in Table 2. The 
assignment of countries to specific groups was based on the classification used by the United Nations’ 
statistics division for defining geographical regions, apart from the ‘Asia and Pacific’ group. Instead 
of using, as in Joyce (2011), geographical criteria, other grouping criteria such as international 
linkages in interbank markets (see Tonzer, 2015) could have been considered. However, criteria based 
on financial connectedness imply, in general, that the closest areas to a given country are its 
neighboring countries in geographical terms and, given their weight in the world economy, some of 
the G7 countries. Therefore, because in this paper contagion effects induced by G7 countries are 
                                                             
5 A banking crisis episode occurs when a country experiences a banking crisis in a given year. Therefore, if in the same year two 
countries experience a banking crisis, two episodes are considered; if the banking crisis in a given country spans over two years, two 
episodes are also considered. 
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considered separately, a classification based on geographical criteria is preferred. 
 
Table 2 
Border territory definition.  
Data source (except the ‘Asia and Pacific’ group): United Nations’ statistics division, available at 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/#geo-regions.  
Region Countries 
Eastern Europe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Western Europe 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Northern Europe 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Estonia and 
Norway. 
Asia and Pacific 
Canada, United States of America, Mexico, Chile, Japan, South Korea, 
Turkey, Israel and Australia. 
 
 
3.2. Banking crisis in the period 1991-2011 
 
Table 3 reports the banking crises identified in the period 1991-2011. The only countries not 
experiencing any banking crisis during this 21-year period were Australia, Canada, Chile and Israel. 
On the other hand, Hungary and Sweden were the countries most affected by such events, with each 
country suffering 7 episodes. Not surprisingly, 2008 to 2011 were the years when more banking crisis 
episodes were recorded, involving 19 OECD countries and a total of 76 banking crisis episodes. In 
addition to the subprime crisis, other crises occurring over five consecutive years were observed in 
Finland, Sweden and Hungary from 1991 to 1995; in the Czech Republic from 1996 to 2000; in 
Slovakia from 1998 to 2002; and in Japan from 1997 to 2001. As Table 3 illustrates, during the period 
of analysis, banking crises tended to occur in the same or adjacent years in several countries in the 
same region, suggesting that a contagion effect of the type considered in hypothesis H4a may be one 
of the reasons for such crises. 
 
3.3. Model variables 
 
Table 4 contains a detailed description of all variables used in the empirical study carried out in 
Section 5. The dependent variable, Crisis, as well the variables measuring contagion effects and bank 
orientation, are dummy variables. Because this study is performed at the country level, the bank-
specific variables are defined as the country/year average values (or their logarithm) of each bank 
characteristic for all sample banks operating in each country in a given year. 
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Table 3 
Banking crisis by region.  
This table shows the concentration of banking crises per region (defined in Table 2) across time. Each reference to each 
country represents one year experiencing a crisis. 
Data source: Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
Year Eastern Europe Western Europe Northern Europe Asia and Pacific 
N. of banking 
crisis episodes 
1991 Hungary 
  
Finland, Sweden, 
Norway   
4 
1992 
Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia   
Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Estonia  
7 
1993 
Hungary, Poland 
    6 
1994   Finland, Sweden, 
Estonia Mexico 
6 
1995 Hungary   5 
1996 
Czech Republic 
    2 
1997    Japan, South 
Korea 
3 
1998 
Czech Republic, 
Slovakia 
   4 
1999    Japan 3 
2000    Japan, Turkey 
4 
2001 
Slovakia 
   3 
2002      1 
2003 
No banking crises 0 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007     United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
2 
2008 
Hungary, Slovenia 
Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, 
Netherlands, 
Greece, Portugal, 
Spain 
Denmark, Iceland, 
Ireland, United 
Kingdom, Sweden 
19 
2009 19 
2010 19 
2011 19 
    Total 126 
 
To construct regulation and supervision indices that incorporate the multiple aspects of these 
activities, all the 12 topics that BRSS comprises were considered: 1. Entry into banking; 2. 
Ownership; 3. Capital; 4. Activities; 5. External auditing requirements; 6. Internal 
management/organizational requirements; 7. Liquidity and diversification requirements; 8. 
Depositors’ (savings) protection schemes; 9. Provision requirements; 10. Accounting/information 
disclosure requirements; 11. Discipline/problem institutions/exit; and 12. Supervision. Each topic 
comprises several questions and sub-questions that might differ slightly across the four BRSS 
released. To construct the indices, 1 point was added whenever an expected answer was observed to 
selected leading questions and 0,5 points for each expected answer observed to selected sub-
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questions. Then, they were normalized to the unit interval. An expected answer is the response that 
induces the best compliance of regulatory and supervisory practices and was defined according to the 
authors’ expectations about what should be a strong regulation and strong supervision. Full details 
about the construction of these indices may be found at http://home.iscte-iul.pt/~jjsro/RWE-
appendix.pdf. 
 
Table 4 
Variables description. 
 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
 
Crisis 
1 if there is a crisis in country i in year t. 
0 otherwise. 
Size 
Logarithm of average banks’ total assets, deflated by the consumer price index (2005=100), 
by country/year. 
Debt Average ratio of banks' non-deposit debt to total liabilities and equity, by country/year. 
Debt including 
customers' deposits 
Average ratio of banks' non-deposit debt plus customers' deposits to total liabilities and 
equity, by country/year. 
Customers' deposits Average ratio of bank customers' deposits to total liabilities and equity, by country/year. 
Debt structure Average ratio of bank customers' deposits to deposits and non-deposit debt, by country/year. 
Solvency Average bank’s solvency ratio by country/year (equity / total assets). 
Real GDP growth rate Growth rate of real GDP. 
Inflation rate  Growth rate of consumer price index (annual average). 
GDP per capita 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (gross domestic product divided by mid-year population) by 
country/year, deflated by consumer price index (2005=100). 
Contagion same region 
1 in year t if there was a crisis in one or more countries from the same region in year t-1. 
0 otherwise. 
Contagion other region 
1 in year t if there was a crisis in one or more countries from another region in year t-1. 
0 otherwise. 
G7 contagion 
1 in year t, if there was a crisis in one or more G7 countries in year t-1. 
0 otherwise. 
Regulation index 
For country i and year t, 1 point for each regulatory practice and 0,5 points for each sub-practice 
registered in the BRSS that uses data collected in year t-2 or earlier (t = 2001,…,2011) or in 
the 2001 BRSS (t = 1991,…,2000), including: 4 questions about 'entry into banking', 1 question 
about 'ownership', 11 questions about 'capital', 4 questions about the topic 'activities' 
(considered together as only one practice), 5 questions about 'external auditing requirements', 
4 questions about 'liquidity and diversification requirements', 6 questions about 'depositor 
(savings) protection schemes', 3 questions about 'provisioning requirements', 5 questions about 
'accounting/information disclosure requirements' and 2 questions about the topic 
'discipline/problem institution/exit'. 
Supervision index 
For country i and year t, 1 point for each regulatory practice and 0,5 points for each sub-practice 
registered in the BRSS that uses data collected in year t-2 or earlier (t = 2001,…,2011) or in 
the 2001 BRSS (t = 1991,…,2000), including 8 questions about 'supervision', 6 questions about 
'external auditing requirements', 1 question about 'internal management/organizational 
requirements', 1 question about 'accounting/information disclosure requirements' and 1 
question about 'discipline/problem institutions/exit'. 
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Bank orientation 
1 if country's financial system is bank-based. 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
Because regulation and supervision activities tend to be adjusted in response to a banking crisis, the 
corresponding indices may not be exogenous, especially in recent years given the magnitude of the 
global crisis beginning in 2007/2008. In order to deal with this potential endogeneity problem, the 
indices constructed for year t are, whenever possible, based on survey data that was collected at least 
two years earlier. In particular, the indices for the period 2008-2011 use data collected in 2005-2006 
(BRSS 2007); the indices for the period 2003-2007 use data collected in 2001 (BRSS 2003); and the 
indices for the remaining years use data collected in 1997-1999 (BRSS 2001). This implies that for 
the first years of the sample (1991-1999) future or contemporary survey data had to be used to compile 
the indices. However, given the more limited scope of the banking crises registered in that period, 
eventual endogeneity issues are not expected to significantly bias the econometric estimates.  
 
Table 5 provides some descriptive statistics for all variables. The wide dispersion displayed by some 
variables reveals that the banking industry and the countries analyzed are very heterogeneous. For 
example: the average debt of banks in some countries is close to zero, while in others it is over half 
of the total liabilities and equity value; the solvency ratio ranges from 2,35% to 59,95%; the growth 
rate of real gross domestic product varies between a negative rate of 13,90% and a maximum of 
24,17%; and the inflation rate ranges from a negative value of 4,48% to an extreme maximum of 
104,54% registered in 1994 in Turkey. 
 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Crisis 647 0,161 0,368 0 1 
Size 647 16,848 1,389 10,250 20,383 
Debt 647 0,184 0,111 0,000 0,615 
Debt including customers' deposits 647 0,880 0,076 0,384 0,973 
Customers' deposits 628 0,695 0,219 0,000 0,967 
Debt structure 599 0,787 0,215 0,000 1,000 
Solvency (%) 647 12,916 9,448 2,350 59,950 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 647 2,817 3,248 -13,899 24,617 
Inflation rate (%) 647 5,402 10,733 -4,480 104,540 
GDP per capita  647 10,070 0,728 8,431 14,575 
Contagion same region 647 0,389 0,488 0 1 
Contagion other region 647 0,750 0,434 0 1 
G7 contagion 647 0,419 0,494 0 1 
Regulation index 647 0,596 0,088 0,377 0,793 
Supervision index 647 0,711 0,135 0,391 0,958 
Bank orientation 647 0,595 0,491 0 1 
Debt x bank orientation 647 0,105 0,124 0,000 0,615 
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4. Econometric methodology 
 
This section describes the panel data binary outcome models used in this study to find the 
determinants of the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis. The following models are 
used: 
▪ Pooled logit and pooled probit; 
▪ Pooled logit and pooled probit with individual-specific effects; 
▪ Fixed effects logit; 
▪ Random effects logit and probit. 
 
The pooled models without individual-specific effects are the typical models used in the cross-
sectional framework: 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) =  𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽),                                                                (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the Crisis variable defined in Table 4; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the vector of 𝑘 explanatory variables 
observed for country 𝑖 in year t; G(𝓏) = 𝑒𝓏/(1 + 𝑒𝓏) (logit model) or G(𝓏) = Φ(𝓏), with Φ(∙) being the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function (probit model); and 𝛽is a vector of parameters. 
Estimates for 𝛽 are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function based on following density 
function for the i-th observation 𝑦𝑖 ≡ (𝑦𝑖1, …, 𝑦𝑖𝑇): 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) =  ∏ 𝐺(
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽)
𝑦𝑖𝑡[1 − 𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽)]
1−𝑦𝑖𝑡.                               (2) 
 
Typical panel data models include individual-specific effects (𝛼𝑖). In linear models, it is usual to 
apply the within transformation or first differencing to remove them before estimation. However, for 
binary models such transformations are not available in general, so one alternative is to estimate the 
individual-specific effects directly. These so-called pooled models with individual-specific effects 
(which in the linear framework are equivalent to fixed effects models) are defined using expressions 
similar to (1) and (2), but with the index function 𝓏 in G(𝓏) being given by 𝓏 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝛼𝑖, where 
𝐷𝑖 assumes the value 1 if the observation regards the country 𝑖 and is 0 otherwise, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 does not 
include a constant term.6 
                                                             
6 Country dummies were only included for countries with recorded banking crises. 
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Fixed effects estimation that eliminates 𝛼𝑖from the model is possible in the case of the logit. In this 
case, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the model is estimated by maximum likelihood conditional on 
the sufficient statistic ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 . Let 𝑩𝑐 =  {𝒅𝑖|  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡 }be the set of all possible sequences of 0 
and 1 for which the sum of T binary outcomes is defined by ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 . Subsequently, estimates for 
𝛽 are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function based on the following density function: 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖| ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) =  
exp [(∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝛽]𝑡
∑  exp [(∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝛽]𝑡𝐝Є𝐁𝑐𝑡
                                                (3) 
 
In this context, it is not possible to estimate the model for countries with 𝑐 = 0, so the panel used in 
this case comprises only countries that suffered at least one banking crisis in the period 1991 to 2011. 
As in linear fixed effects models, unchanged country characteristics (namely, Bank orientation) are 
removed from the model. 
 
Finally, random effects models assume that the individual effects are normally distributed, with 
𝛼𝑖~N(0,𝜎𝛼
2). In this case, maximum-likelihood estimation of 𝛽 and 𝜎𝛼
2is based on the following 
density function: 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽, 𝜎𝛼
2) =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽) 
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝛼2
exp (
−𝛼𝑖
2𝜎𝛼2
)
2
𝑑𝛼𝑖 ,                              (4) 
 
where 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽)is defined similarly to (2) but with G(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽) replaced by G(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖). 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
This section begins with the results obtained for five variants of the panel data probit model with 
individual-specific effects described in the previous section. Then, the remaining models discussed 
in Section 4 are estimated and some specification tests and robustness checks are applied. All models 
were estimated using Stata 13 and considering cluster-robust standard-errors. 
 
5.1. Main results 
 
The five models considered in Table 6 differ in how debt is included. Models (1) and (5) consider 
only non-deposit debt, model (2) includes also customers’ deposits in the definition of debt and 
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models (3) and (4) include variables that allow the separation of the effects on banking crisis 
probability of customers’ deposits and non-deposit debt. Model (5) is the only one where the effect 
of (non-deposit) debt is allowed to be different according to the financial system orientation of the 
country. 
 
Table 6 
Regression results. 
Statistical significance is represented as *, ** and ***, denoting significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors adjusted for 33 clusters (countries) are presented in parentheses. 
 Variable 
Probit with individual-specific effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Size 
-0,327* -0,153 -0,340* -0,154 -0,349* 
(0,193) (0,200) (0,206) (0,215) (0,192) 
Debt 
4,232***  4,129***  7,515*** 
(1,260)  (1,267)  (2,280) 
Customers' deposits   
-0,125   
  (0,418)   
Debt including customers' deposits  
-2,621  -2,817  
 (2,116)  (2,061)  
Debt structure    
-0,815**  
   (0,385)  
Solvency 
-0,015 -0,026 -0,008 -0,024 -0,018 
(0,026) (0,029) (0,025) (0,030) (0,026) 
Real GDP growth rate 
-0,141*** -0,166*** -0,166*** -0,189*** -0,136*** 
(0,036) (0,034) (0,041) (0,038) (0,037) 
Inflation rate 
0,054** 0,042 0,054** 0,040 0,056** 
(0,025) (0,026) (0,027) (0,026) (0,023) 
GDP per capita 
0,333 0,366 0,387 0,404 0,324 
(0,347) (0,341) (0,369) (0,366) (0,338) 
Regulation index 
-3,090 -3,465 -3,504 -3,128 -3,384 
(4,336) (4,193) (4,811) (4,715) (4,391) 
Supervision index 
-1,558 -0,794 -1,914 -1,055 -1,661 
(1,952) (1,853) (1,954) (2,002) (2,067) 
Contagion same region 
1,830*** 1,597*** 1,989*** 1,705*** 1,821*** 
(0,330) (0,321) (0,402) (0,387) (0,331) 
Contagion other region 
-0,274 -0,395 -0,201 -0,182 -0,296 
(0,290) (0,306) (0,329) (0,348) (0,288) 
G7 contagion 
0,883*** 0,794*** 0,914*** 0,771*** 0,927*** 
(0,296) (0,283) (0,314) (0,298) (0,288) 
Banks orientation 
-4,571*** -4,789*** -4,866*** -4,953*** -3,756*** 
(0,965) (1,020) (0,983) (0,986) (1,169) 
Debt x banks orientation     
-4,154* 
    (2,379) 
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of observations 647 647 628 599 647 
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The results in Table 6 show that most of the bank-specific characteristics considered in the first set 
of potential determinants of banking crises are important in influencing the probability of banking 
crises. The results reveal a significant, positive effect of non-deposit debt on the probability of 
countries experiencing a banking crisis. This effect is found in models (1), (3) and (5) by analyzing 
the coefficient of the Debt variable and also in model (4) through the Debt structure variable. In 
contrast, customers’ deposits are not a relevant factor in model (3) and have a negative influence on 
banking crises in model (4); see the Debt structure variable. Given the opposite effects of both 
financing sources, it is no surprise that no relevant effect is found when they are considered together, 
see models (2) and (4). Overall, the results provide full support for hypothesis H1b, since the 
probability of banking crises is higher for countries where banks are on average more indebted; and 
partial support for hypothesis H1c, in the sense that a higher proportion of customers’ deposits in total 
debt mitigates the probability of failure by representing a buffer against bankruptcy. 
 
In three of the models, bank size is also a (marginally) significant variable, having a negative 
influence on the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis, as stated in hypothesis H1a. 
Hence, countries where banks are, on average, larger, have a lower probability of failure. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on bank solvency is negative as expected, but it is not significant in any of the 
five models. Therefore, hypothesis H1d is not supported by the data. 
 
At the macroeconomic level, the results highlight the roles of economic growth and inflation in 
countries’ financial stability, as suggested by previous research. The most robust results are presented 
by the Real GDP growth rate, the only significant variable in all estimated models, at a significance 
level of 1%, of this second group of variables. As formulated in hypothesis H2a, economic growth is 
thus found to be negatively related to the probability of banking crises, suggesting that crises are more 
likely in a weak macroeconomic environment. Inflation rate also seems to be an important 
determinant of a banking crisis, affecting positively the probability of its occurrence, as conjectured 
in hypothesis H2b, in three of the estimated models. As regards GDP per capita, this variable appears 
to have no relevance in explaining a banking crisis, and hence, no support is found for hypothesis 
H2c. 
 
Concerning Research Question 3, the results show that regulation and supervision activities have not 
been successful in preventing banking crises, since neither of the corresponding indices, although 
displaying the expected negative sign, is significant in any of the estimated models. Therefore, 
hypotheses H3a and H3b are not corroborated by the data. 
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In contrast, there is strong evidence of contagion between OECD countries, be it between those in the 
same region or induced by G7 countries. After accounting for these types of contagion, banking crisis 
in other regions does not seem to be relevant. Thus, the major inducers of the propagation of banking 
crises across countries are those from the same geographical area and, due to their global financial 
relevance, G7 countries. Hence, hypotheses H4a and H4c are validated, unlike hypothesis H4b. 
 
The final set of hypotheses tested concern the influence of financial system orientation on the 
probability of banking crises and its interaction with bank debt. The results suggest clearly that crises 
are less probable in countries with bank-based financial systems. Moreover, the interaction variable 
has a negative sign, which indicates that debt is likely to be a more relevant determinant of banking 
crises in countries with market-based financial systems, where banks are less protected by the 
government and other authorities. Hence, both hypotheses H5a and H5b are supported by the results. 
 
5.2. Alternative methods and specification tests 
 
Given the conclusions about the effects of debt-related variables on banking crises, from now on only 
model (5) is considered. Table 7 presents the results obtained for this model when the alternative 
functional forms discussed in Section 4 are used. 
 
In general, the six alternative regression models estimated corroborate the conclusions achieved in 
the previous section. For most variables, the sign and significance of the effects are the same, with 
two exceptions. The first is bank size, which before was only significant at the 10% level and now is 
not significant in any of the estimated models. The second exception is more relevant: there is a major 
difference between pooled and random effects models, on the one hand, and fixed effects models, on 
the other hand. According to the former models, bank-based financial systems are more prone to 
banking crises, while in the latter the opposite occurs. Therefore, it is important to use econometric 
tests to assess, from a statistical point of view, which type of model is more suitable to describe the 
data. 
 
For the same reason that traditional fixed effects models are not available for panel data binary 
regression models, Hausman tests cannot be applied in this context. As an alternative, a simple LR 
test that compares pooled models with and without individual-specific effects was applied. Because 
pooled models produce consistent estimators only when effects are random (in which case individual-
specific effects should not be present in the model), this test is an indirect form of assessing whether 
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the individual effects may be interpreted as fixed or random. The test was applied both for the probit 
case, testing the simple pooled model (6) against the pooled model with individual-specific effects 
(5), and the logit case, comparing the corresponding versions given by models (10) and (8). In both 
cases, the null hypothesis of the correct specification of the pooled model was rejected with a p-value 
of 0. This shows that the most suitable models are the pooled models with individual-specific 
intercepts and reinforces that, as concluded in the previous section, in bank-based financial systems 
there is a lower probability of a banking crisis occurring. 
 
Table 7 
Regression results – alternative models. 
All results were obtained considering model (5) – see Table 6. 
Statistical significance is represented as *, ** and ***, denoting significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors adjusted for 33 or 28 clusters (countries) are presented in parentheses.  
  Other probit models Fixed effects logit models Other logit models 
 Variable 
Pooled 
probit 
Random 
effects 
probit 
Pooled logit 
with individual-
specific effects 
Panel data 
fixed 
effects logit 
model 
Pooled 
logit 
Random 
effects logit 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Size 
-0,081 -0,120 -0,506 -0,236 -0,193 -0,241 
(0,098) (0,091) (0,398) (0,273) (0,195) (0,174) 
Debt 
4,613*** 5,990*** 14,691*** 15,308*** 8,784** 11,538*** 
(1,768) (1,729) (4,295) (4,756) (3,624) (3,389) 
Solvency 
0,010 0,007 -0,013 -0,009 0,028 0,024 
(0,011) (0,011) (0,048) (0,027) (0,022) (0,021) 
Real GDP growth rate 
-0,140*** -0,138*** -0,260*** -0,217*** -0,263*** -0,262*** 
(0,032) (0,026) (0,079) (0,061) (0,066) (0,052) 
Inflation rate 
0,011 0,020** 0,144*** 0,107*** 0,019 0,040** 
(0,009) (0,010) (0,053) (0,037) (0,016) (0,020) 
GDP per capita 
0,367** 0,559*** 0,220 1,074** 0,726** 1,093*** 
(0,164) (0,175) (0,729) (0,482) (0,343) (0,332) 
Regulation index 
-0,449 -0,099 -5,347 -0,557 -0,845 0,074 
(1,491) (1,423) (9,035) (4,182) (2,754) (2,801) 
Supervision index 
-0,376 -0,952 -3,247 -3,381 -0,872 -2,314 
(0,762) (0,911) (4,034) (2,516) (1,466) (1,786) 
Contagion same region 
1,273*** 1,505*** 3,686*** 3,185*** 2,382*** 2,927*** 
(0,185) (0,224) (0,644) (0,500) (0,337) (0,449) 
Contagion other region 
0,192 0,165 -0,637 -0,034 0,482 0,428 
(0,296) (0,297) (0,511) (0,638) (0,559) (0,598) 
G7 contagion 
0,402 0,540** 1,818*** 1,484*** 0,764 1,058*** 
(0,268) (0,209) (0,599) (0,437) (0,525) (0,395) 
Banks orientation 
1,114** 1,496*** -11,708*** - 2,247** 3,033** 
(0,518) (0,503) (2,044) - (1,038) (0,991) 
Debt x banks orientation 
-2,587** -3,413* -7,940* -10,068** -4,734 -6,338* 
(1,764) (1,875) (4,352) (4,969) (3,552) (3,621) 
Intercept -5,064** -6,868*** - - -9,323* -13,335*** 
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(2,538) (2,086) - - (4,807) (4,601) 
Number of countries 33 33 33 28 33 33 
Number of observations  647 647 647 548 647 647 
5.3. Robustness checks and summary of results 
 
In this section, two robustness checks are performed. As reported in Table 1, US banks account for 
more than half the sample and hence they have a major influence on the results obtained. Therefore, 
in order to check the robustness of the previous findings, the probit model with individual-specific 
effects (5) was re-estimated excluding US banks. The results are presented in Table 8 and confirm 
the conclusions found for the original panel. All variables maintain their statistical significance and 
type of effect in explaining banking crises. 
 
Table 8 
Robustness checks. 
All results were obtained considering model (5) – see Table 6. 
Statistical significance is represented as *, ** and ***, denoting significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors adjusted for 33 (systemic crises) or 32 clusters (results 
excluding USA crises) are presented in parentheses.  
Variable Excluding US crises Systemic crises 
 (12) (13) 
Size 
-0,393* -0,492** 
(0,206) (0,241) 
Debt 
7,976*** 8,737*** 
(2,366) (3,116) 
Solvency 
-0,017 -0,018 
(0,026) (0,028) 
Real GDP growth rate 
-0,131*** -0,110** 
(0,038) (0,035) 
Inflation rate 
0,063*** 0,041* 
(0,023) (0,021) 
GDP per capita 
0,208 0,427 
(0,386) (0,320) 
Regulation index 
-0,706 -4,319 
(3,909) (4,728) 
Supervision index 
-1,486 -2,019 
(2,302) (2,369) 
Contagion same region 
1,877*** 1,691*** 
(0,370) (0,331) 
Contagion other region 
-0,159 -0,289 
(0,288) (0,363) 
G7 contagion 
0,976*** 0,930*** 
(0,315) (0,345) 
Banks orientation 
-3,921*** -1,349 
(1,089) (1,925) 
Debt x banks orientation -4,162* -4,801 
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(2,417) (3,195) 
Number of clusters 32 33 
Number of observations  626 647 
 
The second robustness test concerns the type of crises included in the analysis. So far, all types of 
crises, whether classified as systemic or borderline, have been considered (see Section 3.1). However, 
some countries only suffered borderline crises (Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Sweden and Switzerland). Hence, in order to ascertain whether there are differences when only 
systemic crises are considered, model (5) was re-estimated setting the Crisis variable to zero in the 
presence of borderline banking crisis episodes. Table 8 reveals that in general most of the previous 
conclusions are still valid when considering only systemic crises. The most relevant difference is that, 
for systemic crises, there are no relevant differences between bank and market-based financial 
systems. This suggests that the greater government protection that banks have in the former system 
does not significantly reduce the probability of banking crisis in case of major financial shocks. 
 
Table 9 provides a brief summary of the main conclusions of the empirical study carried out in this 
paper, which involved the estimation of 13 regression models. For each tested hypothesis, the table 
indicates the models where the hypothesis was corroborated by the data, those where the effect is not 
statistically relevant and those where the opposite sign was found. Apart from Research Question 4 
(Regulation and Supervision), in all the other cases full or partial support was found for most of the 
formulated empirical hypotheses. Note that the opposite, significant effect found for two hypotheses 
are relative to pooled and random-effects models, which were found unsuitable from a statistical point 
of view. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper was to identify the determinants of banking crises in OECD countries. The 
results suggest that banking crises tend to occur mostly in countries where banks are smaller and 
present higher levels of debt and when the economic environment slows down and a higher inflation 
rate is registered. There is evidence of a contagion effect across countries, namely between those 
located in the same region or induced by G7 countries. In contrast, regulation and supervision of 
banking activities seem to have failed to prevent banking crisis episodes. It was also found that 
countries with bank-based financial systems present less probability of banking crises and that debt 
is a more important determinant of distress for market-based countries, namely when borderline crises 
are considered. 
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Table 9 
Summary of conclusions. 
Research question Empirical hypotheses 
Conclusion (model #) 
Postulated 
effect 
Insignificant 
effect 
Opposite 
effect 
1. Do the bank-specific 
characteristics in each 
country influence the 
probability of banking 
crises? 
H1a: Bank size decreases the probability of 
banking crises  
1, 3, 5, 12-
13 
2,4, 6-11 --- 
H1b: Bank debt increases the probability of 
banking crises  
1, 3-13 --- --- 
H1c: Customers’ deposits decrease the 
probability of banking crises 
4 3 --- 
H1d: Bank solvency decreases the probability 
of banking crises  
--- 1-13 --- 
2. Do the country-specific 
macroeconomic 
conditions affect the 
probability of banking 
crises? 
H2a: The real gross domestic product growth 
rate is negatively related to the probability of 
banking crises 
1-13 --- --- 
H2b: Inflation is positively related to the 
probability of banking crises 
1, 3, 5, 7-9, 
11-13 
2, 4, 6, 10 --- 
H2c: Domestic product per capita is 
negatively related to the probability of 
banking crises 
--- 
1-5, 8, 12-
13 
6-7, 9-11 
3. Can regulation and 
supervision prevent 
banking crises? 
H3a: Strong regulation reduces the 
probability of banking crises 
--- 1-13 --- 
H3b: Strong supervision reduces the 
probability of banking crises 
--- 1-13 --- 
4. Can banking crises 
result from a contagion 
effect across countries? 
H4a: Banking crises are originated by 
contagion across countries from the same 
geographical region 
1-13 --- --- 
H4b: Banking crises are originated by 
contagion across countries from any 
geographical region 
--- 1-13 --- 
H4c: Banking crises are originated by 
contagion induced by G7 countries 
1-5, 7-9, 
11-13 
6, 10 --- 
5. Do countries with 
bank-based financial 
systems have a lower 
probability of a banking 
crisis? 
H5a: Bank-based financial systems are less 
prone to banking crisis 
1-5, 8, 12 13 6-7, 10-11 
H5b: The negative effect of debt on the 
likelihood of a banking crisis is higher for 
countries with market-based financial 
systems  
5-9, 11-12 10, 13 --- 
 
 
References 
 
Aggarwal, R. and Jacques, K. T. (2001), “The impact of FDICIA and prompt corrective action on 
bank capital and asset risk: Estimates using a simultaneous equation model”, Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 25, 1139-1160, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00125-4. 
Aiyar, S., Calomiris, C. W. and Wieladek, T. (2015), “Bank capital regulation: theory, empirics, and 
policy”, IMF Economic Review 63(4), 955-983, doi:10.1057/imfer.2015.18. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2007), Understanding Financial Crises, 1st edition, 2-94, New York, Oxford 
26 
 
University Press. 
Angkinand, A. (2009), “Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises”, Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19(2), 240-257, 
doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2007.12.001. 
Barrell, R.,Davis, E. P., Karim, D. ad Liadze, I. (2010), “Bank regulation, property prices and early 
warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(9), 
2255–2264, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.02.015. 
Bank for International Settlements (2015), International Consolidated Banking Statistics, BIS Basel, 
available at: http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm. 
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G and Levine, R. (2001), “Banking systems around the globe: Do regulation and 
ownership affect performance and stability?”, in Frederic S. Mishkin (editor) Prudential 
Supervision – What Works and What Doesn’t, 31-96, University of Chicago Press. 
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2008), “Bank regulations are changing: for better or worse?”, 
Comparative Economic Studies, 50, 537–563, doi:10.1057/ces.2008.33. 
Benston, G., Irvine, P., Rosenfeld, J. and Sinkey Jr, J. F. (2003), “Bank capital structure, regulatory 
capital, and securities innovations”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(3), 301-322. 
Berger, A. N. and Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013), “How does capital affect bank performance during 
financial crises?”, Journal of Financial Economics,109(1), 146-176, 
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008. 
Bongini, P., Claessens, S. and Ferri, G., (2001),“The political economy of distress in East Asian 
financial institutions”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 19(1), 5–25, 
doi:10.1023/A:1011174316191. 
Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D. and Martinez-Peria, M. S. (2001), “Is the crisis problem 
growing more severe?”, Economic Policy, 16 (32), 53-82, doi:10.1111/1468-0327.00070 52-82. 
Boyd, J., Nicolò, G. and  Loukoianova, E. (2009), “Banking crises and crisis dating : theory and 
evidence”, IMF working paper WP/09/141, 1-50. 
Brewer III, E., Kaufman, G. G. and Wall, L. D. (2008), “Bank capital ratios across countries: Why 
do they vary?”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 34(2-3), 177–201, doi:10.1007/s10693-
008-0040-9. 
Bussiere, M. and Fratzscher, M. (2006), “Towards a new early warning system of financial crises”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 25, 953-973, doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2006.07.007. 
Calomiris, C. W. and Mason, J. R. (1997), “Contagion and bank failures during the great depression: 
The June 1932 Chicago banking panic”, American Economic Review, 87(5), 863-883. 
Calvo, G. A. and Mendoza, E. G. (2000), “A capital-market crises and economic collapse in emerging 
markets: an informational frictions approach”, American Economic Review, 90, 59-64. 
27 
 
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2005), Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, 1st edition, 
795-798, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Cebenoyan, A. S. and Strahan, P. E. (2004), “Risk management, capital structure and lending at 
banks”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 19–43, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00391-6. 
Chenguel, M. B. (2014), “The subprime crisis contagion effect on developed countries”, Journal of 
Business and Management Research, 3, 61-70. 
Čihák, M. and Schaeck, K. (2010), “How well do aggregate bank ratios identify banking problems?”, 
Journal of Financial Stability, 6(3), 130-144, doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2010.03.001. 
Davis, E. P. and Karim, D. (2008a), “Comparing early warning systems for banking crises”, Journal 
of Financial Stability, 4(2), 89–120, doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2007.12.004. 
Davis, E. P. and Karim, D. (2008b), “Could early warning systems have helped to predict the sub-
prime crisis?”, National Institute Economic Review, 206(1), 35–47, 
doi:10.1177/0027950108099841. 
Deltuvaité, V. and Sinevičiené, L. (2014), “Research on the relationship between the structure of 
financial system and economic development”, Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 156, 
533-537. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (1998), “The determinants of banking crises in developing 
and developed countries”, Staff Papers International Monetary Fund, 45(1), 81-109, 
doi:10.2307/3867330. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (2000), “Monitoring banking sector fragility: A multivariate 
logit approach”, World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 287-307, doi:10.1093/wber/14.2.287. 
Demirguc-Kunt,  A.and Detragiache, E. (2005),“Cross-country empirical studies of systemic bank 
distress: a survey”, National Institute Economic Review, 192(1), 68–83, 
doi:10.1177/002795010519200108. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2001), “Bank-based and Market-based financial systems: Cross-
country comparisons”, in Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (Eds.) Financial Structure and 
Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development, 81-140, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Feyen, E. and Levine, R. (2011), “Optimal financial structures and development: 
the evolving importance of banks and markets”, World Bank. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/DemirgucFeyenLevine060311.pdf. 
Diamond, D. W. and Dybving, P. H. (1983), “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 91(3), 401-419. 
Diamond, D. W. and Rajan, R. G. (2000), “A theory of bank capital”, The Journal of Finance, 55(6), 
2431-2465. 
28 
 
Dincer, N. and Neyapti, B. (2008), “What determines the “legal” quality of bank regulation and 
supervision?”, Contemporary Economic Policy, 26(4), 607-622. 
Duttagupta, R. and Cashin, P. (2011), “The anatomy of banking crises in developing and emerging 
market countries”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 30, 354–376, 
doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2010.08.006. 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A. and Wyplosz, C. (1996), “Contagious currency crises: first tests”, The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98(4), 463-484, doi:10.2307/3440879. 
Englund, P. (1999), “The Swedish banking crisis: Roots and consequences”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 15(3), 80-97, doi:10.1093/oxrep/15.3.80. 
Glick R., Guo X. and Hutchison, M. (2006), “Currency crises, capital account liberalization, and 
selection bias”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 698-714, doi:10.1162/rest.88.4.698. 
Gorton, Gary (1988), “Banking panics and the business cycle”, Oxford Economic Papers, 40, 751-
781. 
Gropp, R. and Heider, F. (2010), “The determinants of bank capital structure”, Review of Finance, 
14, 587-622, doi:10.1093/rof/rfp030. 
Hoggarth, G., Jackson, P. and Nier, E. (2005), “Banking crises and the design of safety nets”, Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 29(1), 143-159, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.019. 
Hutchinson, M. and McDill, K. (1999), “Are all banking crises alike? The Japanese experience in 
international comparison”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 13(3), 155-
180, doi:10.1006/jjie.1999.0427. 
Hutchinson, M. M. (2002), “European banking distress and EMU: Institutional and macroeconomic 
risks”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(3), 365-389, doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00292. 
Inderst, R. and Muller, H. M. (2008), “Bank capital structure and credit decisions”, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 17(3), 295-314, doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2008.02.006. 
Jacques, K. and Nigro, P. (1997), “Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital: A simultaneous 
equations approach”, Journal of Economics and Business, 49, 533-547, doi:10.1016/S0148-
6195(97)00038-6. 
Joyce, J. P. (2011), “Financial globalization and banking crises in Emerging Markets”, Open 
Economies Review, 22(5), 875-895. 
Klomp, J. (2010), “Causes of banking crises revisited”, North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 21(1), 72-87, doi:10.1016/j.najef.2009.11.005.  
Kodres, L. and Pritsker, M. (2002), “A rational expectations model of financial contagion”, The 
Journal of Finance, 57, 768-799, doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00441. 
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2013), “Systemic banking crises database”, IMF Economic Review, 
61(2), 225-270, doi:10.1057/imfer.2013.12. 
29 
 
Lainà, P., Nyholma, J. and Sarlin, P. (2015), “Leading indicators of systemic banking crises: Finland 
in a panel of EU countries”, Review of Financial Economics, 24, 18–35, 
doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2014.12.002. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1998), “Law and finance”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Miao, J. and Wang, P. (2015), “Banking bubbles and financial crises”, Journal of Economic Theory 
157, 763-792, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.004. 
Miskhin, F. (1978), “The household balance sheet and the great depression,” Journal of Economic 
History, 38(4), 918–937. 
Moshirian, F. and Wu, Q. (2009),“Banking industry volatility and banking crises”, Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19(2), 351–370, 
doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2008.02.002. 
Moosa, I. A. (2010), “Basel II as a casualty of the global financial crisis”, Journal of Banking 
Regulation, 11(2), 95-114, doi:10.1057/jbr.2010.2. 
Prescott, E. S. (2001), “Regulating bank capital structure to control risk”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond Economic Quarterly, 87(3), 35-52, doi:10.1.1.201.9205. 
Rime, B. (2001), “Capital requirements and bank behavior: Empirical evidence for Switzerland”, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 25, 789-805, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00105-9. 
Tonzer, L. (2015), “Cross-border interbank networks, banking risk and contagion”, Journal of 
Financial Stability, 18, 19-32, doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2015.02.002. 
